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THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW
VISION OF FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
In a 1981 law review article, Sandra Day O'Connor, then an Arizona
appellate judge, suggested that our judicial system could be im-
proved by limiting federal review of adjudications of federal con-
stitutional questions by state courts:1
If our nation's bifurcated judicial system is to be retained, as I am
sure it will be, it is clear that we should strive to make both the
federal and the state systems strong, independent, and viable.
State courts will undoubtedly continue in the future to litigate
federal constitutional questions. State judges in assuming office
take an oath to support the federal as well as the state constitu-
tion. State judges do in fact rise to the occasion when given the
responsibility and opportunity to do so. It is a step in the right
direction to defer to the state courts and give finality to their
judgments on federal constitutional questions where a full and
fair adjudication has been given in the state court.
Judge O'Connor singled out federal habeas corpus review of state
convictions as a notable example of our system's "strange" and "im-
perfect" duplication of judicial time and effort.2 Unfortunately, ac-
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cording to Judge O'Connor, "[c]hanges and improvements come
very slowly, if at all, and, more often than not, incrementally, in
small case by case adjustments." 3
In 1989, as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Sandra
Day O'Connor was able to help frustrate her own prediction about
the slow pace of reform of federal habeas. Justice O'Connor's lead
opinions for a plurality of the Court in Teague v. Lane,4 and for a ma-
jority in the followup case of Penry v. Lynaugh,5 significantly nar-
rowed the scope of federal habeas by excluding claims based on "new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure," or rules that are an-
nounced after a defendant's conviction becomes "final."' 6 The only
exceptions to the Teague rule, that "new law" does not apply retroac-
tively to habeas cases, are decisions placing a certain defendant or
conduct beyond the reach of the substantive law of crimes or punish-
ments, and decisions recognizing a procedural right so fundamental
that, without it, the "likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished.'"7
Teague generated surprisingly little reaction, perhaps because it
was only a plurality decision, and perhaps because it involved the
complex and seemingly "technical" issue of habeas retroactivity.
Properly understood, however, and in view of its endorsement by a
majority in Penry, Teague represents a watershed decision in the his-
tory of federal habeas. Put simply, Teague articulates a new vision of
federal habeas that, if not overturned by the Court or by Congress, 8
will eventually reshape the entire area of the law. Teague may be the
most important habeas decision since Fay v. Noia.9
The impact of Teague will be felt on four different levels. First,
Teague has obvious and immediate significance at the doctrinal level.
lbid.
4109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). Although several parts of Justice O'Connor's Teague opinion were
joined by a majority of the Court, the parts of the opinion most important to the subject of this
article were joined only by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
5109 S.Ct. 2934 (1989).
6 See Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1075.
7Id. at 1075-77.
8in Teague, Justice White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he invited
Congress to "correct" the Court, should it feel that the case was wrongly decided. See id. at
1079 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). At least one effort to address by legislation some
of the issues raised by Teague is already under way. See Hoffmann, Retroactivity and the Great
Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
9372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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Although the precise meaning of terms like "new law" and "final"
remains to be worked out in future cases, Teague clearly changes the
rules of the habeas game, and substantially restricts the availability
to federal habeas petitioners of new constitutional decisions.
Second, the doctrinal changes set forth in Teague reflect a major
change at the theoretical level. Teague shifts the focus of federal
habeas from the correction of constitutional errors affecting the con-
viction of an individual defendant to the deterrence, by means of re-
versing state criminal convictions, of constitutional errors by state
courts. This theoretical shift is reminiscent of the Burger Court's
latter-day view that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a
tool for deterring police misconduct, and not an individual right of a
criminal defendant. 10
In addition to its doctrinal and theoretical implications, Teague will
have a significant impact on habeas practice. After Teague, the lower
federal courts will see more habeas petitions claiming that the state
courts misapplied existing federal law, and fewer petitions asking for
new constitutional rules or new interpretations of existing rules. The
lower federal courts also will be much less likely to find merit in a
second 'or subsequent habeas petition. And the Supreme Court will
not review habeas cases at all, except for an occasional case in which
the petition for certiorari is fied by a losing state warden, or in which
an issue arises about the scope of the Teague exceptions. This is be-
cause, after Teague, almost all certiorari petitions filed by state pris-
oners will be either uncertworthy, because they do not raise novel
legal issues, or unreviewable, because they raise issues that cannot be
decided in the petitioner's favor.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the long run, Teague will
have an effect on the development of federal constitutional rules of
criminal procedure. The institutional impact of Teague-the extent
of which can be perceived only dimly at present-will mean that the
federal courts will render fewer constitutional criminal procedure
decisions and the state courts will render more. This will lead to
greater variation in the way federal constitutional rules of criminal
procedure are interpreted and applied in the states, and may alter the
sensitive balance between the societal interest in preventing and pun-
ishing crime and the rights of criminal defendants.
'
0 See, e.g., Stonev. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that Fourth Amendmentclaims are
not cognizable on federal habeas unless the petitioner was denied a "full and fair opportunity
for a hearing" in the state courts); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding in favor
of a "good faith" exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
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I. TEAGUE, PENRY, AND THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW DOCTRINE OF
HABEAS RETROACTIVITY
In Teague, the petitioner, a black man, appealed his state
convictions on the ground that the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to remove black prospective jurors denied him a jury rep-
resenting a fair cross-section of the community, in violation of the
Sixth Amendment. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the fair
cross-section claim, 11 the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to ap-
peal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 12
The petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court, repeating his fair cross-section claim and
adding an equal protection claim based on the prosecutor's allegedly
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The district court de-
nied the petition, but a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed, and the case was taken en banc. 13 The en banc rehear-
ing was postponed pending the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in
Batson v. Kentucky, 14 in which the Court held that an equal protection
claim could be based on improper use of peremptory challenges in a
single case. After Batson was decided, the en banc Seventh Circuit
ruled that the petitioner could not benefit from the Batson equal pro-
tection holding, since Batson did not apply retroactively to habeas
cases. 15 The Seventh Circuit rejected the petitioner's fair cross-
section claim on the merits. 16
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, presumably for the pur-
pose of deciding whether the fair cross-section requirement should
apply to the petit jury, or more specifically to the use of peremptory
challenges. When the decision was finally handed down, however, a
majority of the Court declined to reach the merits of the fair cross-
section claim. Instead, Justice O'Connor, who wrote the lead opin-
ion in support of the Court's judgment affirming the Seventh Cir-
11108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 895-97, 439 N.E.2d 1066, 1069-71 (1982).
12464 U.S. 867 (1983).
13779 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
14476 U.S. 79 (1986).
I"See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiani) (holdingBatson does not apply retro-
actively to habeas cases).
16820 F.2d 832 (7th Cit. 1987) (en banc). Judge Cudahy dissented. Id. at 844.
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cuit, used the case to reconsider "how the question of retroactivity
should be resolved for cases on collateral review."17
The retroactivity problem posed by Teague was difficult: When a
federal court reviews a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner,
should it apply the law which existed at the time the prisoner was
convicted, or the law which exists at the time of the habeas proceed-
ing? Or, to put the same issue differently, when the Court's view of
"the law" has changed between the time the prisoner's conviction be-
came "final" on direct review and the time of the federal habeas pro-
ceeding, should the "new law" apply "retroactively" to the habeas
case?
Before Teague, these questions were answered on a rule-by-rule
basis, using the three-part balancing test set forth in the Court's 1965
decision in Linkletter v. Walker. 18 The Linkletter test examined (1) the
purpose of the new rule, (2) the reliance placed on the old rule, and (3)
the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of
the new rule.19 The Linkletter decision was criticized almost imme-
diately by commentators,20 and within a few years by several mem-
bers of the Court as well. 21 But the Linkletter test continued to serve
17109 S.Ct. at 1069 (opinion of O'Connor, J., writing in part for the Court and in part for a
plurality of the Court).
18381 U.S. 618 (1965).
19 See id. at 629.
20 See Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va. L. Rev.
1557, 1558 & n. 3 (1975) (citing examples); see also Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Su-
preme Court Retroactivity Analysis, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1062 (1985). For general discussions of
the retroactivity issue, see, e.g., Schaefer, The Control of"Sunbursts": Techniques ofProspec-
tive Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631 (1967); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due
Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (1966); Mishkin, The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56 (1965); Currier, Time and Change in judge-Made Law: Prospec-
tive Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1965); Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 631 (1964); Meador, Habeas Corpus and the "Retroactivity" Illusion, 50 Va. L.
Rev. 1115 (1964); Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 378 (1964); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke LJ. 319; Tor-
cia & King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 Dick. L.
Rev. 269 (1962); Redlich, Constitutional Law, 1962 Survey of New York Law, 14 Syr. L. Rev.
167 (1962); Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v.
Ohio, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 650 (1962); Levy, Realist jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling,
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1.(1960).
2 1See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing Linketter approach on grounds of inconsistency with judicial role); Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring in the judgment) (same); id., at
713 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting) (criticizingLinkletter approach on grounds that
all new rules should apply retroactively in habeas cases).
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as the benchmark for habeas retroactivity, until the Court decided to
reexamine the issue in Teague.
Although Justice O'Connor's lead opinion in Teague, which was
joined in full by three Justices and in part by two others, addressed
several issues, for present purposes I shall discuss only four portions
of the opinion, each of which was joined by a four-member plurality
of the Court that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy. For clarity's sake, I will also rearrange the order
of the discussion.
In the most important portion of her opinion, Justice O'Connor
declared that "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not
be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new
rules are announced. 22 She identified several reasons for adopting a
general rule of non-retroactivity on habeas, including the inconsis-
tent and confusing results often produced by the Linkletter test and
the fact that the Linkletter test occasionally led to the disparate treat-
ment of similarly situated habeas petitioners. The most important
reason for the new habeas retroactivity rule, however, was Justice
O'Connor's contention that the purpose of federal habeas is to deter
state courts from ignoring or erroneously construing federal con-
stitutional standards. According to Justice O'Connor, "[iln order to
perform this deterrence function, the habeas court need only apply
the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original
proceedings took place." 23 Justices Stevens and Blackmun, although
they did not join this portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, agreed
with her view that "new law" generally should not apply retroac-
tively to habeas cases. 24
In another significant portion of her opinion, Justice O'Connor
discussed the meaning of the term, "new law," for purposes of apply-
ing the Teague retroactivity rule. She admitted that deciding whether
a case announces a "new rule" is difficult, but concluded that, in gen-
eral, "a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or im-
poses a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. ' 25
As examples of "new law," she cited the Court's decisions in Rock v.
22109 S.Ct. at 1075 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
23See Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).





Arkansas,26 holding thatperse exclusion of hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony violates a defendant's right to testify on his own behalf, and
Fordv. Wainwright,27 holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of insane persons. In sum, "a case announces a new
rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final." 28
Next, Justice O'Connor identified two exceptions to the Teague
retroactivity rule. The first exception allows for retroactive applica-
tion of new rules that place "certain kinds of primary, private individ-
ual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe. '29 The second exception permits retroactive applica-
tion of new rules "without which the likelihood of an accurate convic-
tion is seriously diminished, '30 such as rules barring the domination
of trials by mob violence, a prosecutor's knowing use of perjured tes-
timony, and the use of confessions coerced by "brutal methods."
Finally, Justice O'Connor stated that retroactivity is a threshold
question that should be resolved prior to a decision on the merits.
According to Justice O'Connor, if a habeas court were to declare a
new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, without applying it on
behalf of the petitioner, the court would be issuing an advisory opin-
ion. But if the court were to announce a new rule and apply it on
behalf of the petitioner, then the principle of equal treatment would
require that all other habeas petitioners also benefit from the new
rule, eliminating any possibility of non-retroactivity. The better
view, therefore, is that the habeas court must resolve the retroactivity
issue first, deciding the merits of the petitioner's claim only if the
new rule sought is one that would apply retroactively to habeas
cases.
Applying these principles to Teague's fair cross-section claim, Jus-
tice O'Connor, writing for the same four-member plurality, con-
cluded that the claim was based on "new law," that it was governed
by the Teague retroactivity doctrine, and that it did not fit within ei-
ther of the exceptions that would have warranted retroactive applica-
26483 U.S. 44(1987).
27477 U.S. 399 (1986).
28109 S.Ct. at 1070.
29 See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring in the judgment).
30 Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1077.
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tion. Accordingly, because Teague would not be entitled to relief
even if his interpretation of the law were to prevail, the Seventh Cir-
cuit properly denied Teague's habeas petition. Justices White, Ste-
vens, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment, although Justices
Stevens and Blackmun disagreed withJustice O'Connor on the scope
of the second Teague exception and on the threshold nature of the
retroactivity issue. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, 31 a case decided four months after Teague, Jus-
tice O'Connor was able to clarify some of the language in Teague and
obtain a fifth vote for some of the views she expressed there. Penry
involved a mentally retarded Texas man who had been convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Texas courts
rejected Penry's claims that the jury was inadequately instructed at
the sentencing phase of the trial, that the Texas death penalty system
improperly limits the jury's consideration of mitigating circum-
stances, and that the imposition of the death penalty against men-
tally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment. 32 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 33
Penry then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, alleging
that the Eighth Amendment requires jury instructions on mitigating
circumstances in capital sentencing, and that the use of the death pen-
alty against mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. The district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 34 The court stressed, however, that it did
not believe the jury that sentenced Penry to death could have given
full effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation, in
light of the Texas death penalty system and the jury instructions at
sentencing. On the jury instruction claim, the court based its affir-
mance on Circuit precedent. I
On certiorari, the Supreme Court first had to decide whether the
Teague retroactivity doctrine applies to capital sentencing. In a por-
tion of her lead opinion that was joined by a majority of the Court
including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and
Kennedy, Justice O'Connor explained that finality concerns are as
relevant to capital sentencing as they are to convictions. She con-
3'Note 5 supra.
32 Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
33Penry v. Texas, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986).
34 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987).
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cluded that the Teague rule, along with its two exceptions and the re-
quirement that retroactivity be treated as a threshold-issue, applies to
new constitutional rules in the context of capital sentencing. 1s
Having held that Teague applies to capital sentencing, the Court
faced two retroactivity issues. Penry's jury instruction claim was
based on Lockett v. Ohio36 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,37 both decided
well before Penry's trial, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a
defendant has an Eighth Amendment right to present any and all
mitigating evidence that might cause a sentencer to return a life ver-
dict. But the Court had also upheld the facial validity of the Texas
death penalty system in several cases, noting that the Texas system
seems to allow full consideration of mitigating circumstances by the
sentencing jury despite the absence of any reference to such circum-
stances in the jury instructions. 38 Thus, the first question was
whether Penry's jury instruction claim would require the Court to
make "new law" in his behalf.
Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority including Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, reiterated her Teague defini-
tion that a "new rule" is one that is not "dictated by precedent existing
at the time the defendant's conviction became final."3 9 The Court's
decisions upholding the Texas death penalty system, most of which
predated Penry's conviction, had emphasized that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires full consideration of mitigating circumstances by a
capital sentencing jury. These decisions, along with Lockett and
Eddings, effectively "dictated" that Texas sentencing juries must,
upon a defendant's request, be given instructions that permit full
consideration of mitigating circumstances. Moreover, the Court's de-
cisions upholding the Texas death penalty system were premised on
assurances that the system allowed full consideration of mitigating
3"The same portion of'Justice O'Connor's opinion also reiterated her Teague view that retro-
activity should be treated as a threshold issue, and that a habeas court should address the merits
of a petitioner's "nfew law" claim only if it finds that the "new law" would apply retroactively on
habeas. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens declined to join this portion of
Justice O'Connor's opinion. However, Justices Brennan and Marshall joined another portion
of'Justice O'Connor's opinion in which she made the same point about the threshold nature of
the habeas retroactivity issue. It is not clear whether the decision to join Justice O'Connor on
the threshold point was intentional or a mistake on the part of'Justices Brennan and Marshall.
36438 U.S. 586 (1978).
37455 U.S. 104 (1982).
38See, e.g., Lowenfeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
39109 S.Ct. at 2944.
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circumstances. Penry's jury instruction claim thus did not seek to
"impos[e] a new obligation" on the State of Texas. Instead, Penry's
claim was simply that "those assurances [made by the state in prior
cases] were not fulfilled in his particular case, "'4 given the unique na-
ture of his mitigating evidence and the language of the jury instruc-
tions. In short, the claim was not based on a "new rule," and the
Court could consider it on its merits.
The second habeas retroactivity issue in Penry dealt with the scope
of the Teague exceptions. Penry's claim that the Eighth Amendment
bars the use of the death penalty against mentally retarded persons
obviously would require the Court to adopt a "new rule." Thus, in
the absence of an exception, the Court would be unable to consider
the claim on its merits, since the "new rule" would not apply retroac-
tively to Penry's case.
Justice O'Connor, writing for Justices Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, focused on the exception for "new rules" that
place "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." 4 1 The
purpose of this exception, according to Justice O'Connor, is to allow
retroactive application of new rules based on "substantive categorical
guarantees" contained in the Constitution. The Court had pre-
viously found such guarantees in the Eighth Amendment, at least
with respect to punishments, as well as in the Due Process Clause.
Thus, Justice O'Connor held, the exception should include "not
only rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary con-
duct but also rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a
class of defendants because of their status or offense. 42 As a result,
the Court again could consider Penry's claim on its merits.
A majority of the Court ultimately rejected Penry's claim that the
Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty for mentally retarded
persons, although Justice O'Connor split with Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy on the reasons for this
rejection. A different majority of the Court reversed Penry's death
sentence, however, and ordered a new sentencing hearing based on
the jury instruction claim, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens joining the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion
announcing and explaining the reversal. Justice Scalia, joined by the
4Id. at 2947.
4 1See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692 (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring in the judgment).
42109 S.Ct. at 2953.
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Chief Justice and Justices White and Kennedy, dissented on the
ground that the jury instruction claim was based on "new law" and
therefore should not have been heard on the merits under Teague.
II. TEAGUE AND THE COURT'S NEW THEORY OF FEDERAL HABEAS
The doctrinal changes set forth in Teague and Penry are closely
linked to the Court's view about the underlying theory of federal
habeas. Because the Court in Teague lacked meaningful historical
guidance on the issue of habeas retroactivity, it was compelled-to re-
solve the issue by reference to theoretical considerations. The doc-
trine announced in Teague, and adopted by a majority of the Court in
Penry, was the product of a theory of habeas which was first articu-
lated by Justice Harlan in the late 1960s,43 but which before last
Term had never been adopted by the Court. The theory, which
holds that the purpose of habeas is to deter the state courts from com-
mitting constitutional errors, emerged in Teague and Penry as an at-
tractive choice for those Justices who, like Justice O'Connor, were
concerned about the proper allocation of responsibility between the
state and federal courts in the area of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure.
A. THE LACK OF HISTORICAL GUIDANCE ON THE
HABEAS RETROACTIVITY ISSUE
Habeas retroactivity was not addressed by the Supreme Court be-
fore Linkletter v. Walker because, as a practical matter, the issue al-
most never arose. 44 Until the mid-20th century, the Court narrowly
43 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Mackey, 410 U.S. at 675 (Harlan, J., dissenting and concurring in the judgment).
44In a footnote to the majority opinion inLinkletter, 381 U.S., at 628-29 n. 13,Justice Clark
cited several examples of pre-Linkletter cases in which the Court applied "new law" to habeas
cases without discussing the issue of retroactivity: "Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357
U.S. 214(1958), applied the rule of Giffinv. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), requiring the State to
furnish transcripts of the trial to indigents on appeal, to a 1935 conviction. The rule in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that counsel must be appointed to represent an indigent
charged with a felony, was actually applied retrospectively in that case since Gideon had col-
laterally attacked the prior judgment by post-conviction remedies. See also Doughty v. Maxwell,
376 U.S. 202 (1964).Jacksonv. Denno, 378 U.S. 368(1964), involving a coerced confession, was
also applied to the petitioner who was here on a collateral attack. See also McNerlin v. Denno,
378 U.S. 575 (1964). It is also contended that Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), supports the
conclusion of absolute retroactivity in the constitutional area since the petitioner convicted in
1937 was released after a finding that the confession was coerced when judged by standards set
forth in our cases decided subsequent to his conviction. See United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay,
333 F.2d 12, 24 (dissenting opinion of Marshall,J.)."
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limited the Act of 1867, which first authorized federal habeas review
of state criminal convictions, to challenges to the jurisdiction of the
state court. 45 Even where the Court stretched the concept of jurisdic-
tion to consider claims of constitutional error, it would not hear such
claims on the merits if the state court had provided the defendant a
"fair opportunity" to litigate the claims.46 Federal habeas, in short,
was rarely available to state prisoners. And, of course, until the
1960s and the rise of the incorporation doctrine, the Court simply
did not have much constitutional law to apply to state criminal pro-
ceedings.
In Brown v. Allen, 47 in 1953, the Court expanded the availability of
the statutory writ, for the first time reaching the merits of a peti-
tioner's constitutional claim without even attempting to link those
claims to the jurisdiction of the state court. Nevertheless, even after
Brown, the habeas retroactivity issue did not arise often, because
habeas petitioners were still required to have raised their constitu-
tional claims properly in state court in order to obtain later habeas
relief.48
Habeas retroactivity first became important in 1963, when the
Court issued its landmark decision in Fay v. Noia.49 In Fay, the
Court, per Justice Brennan, held that in some cases habeas relief
could be granted even though the petitioner had failed to raise his
constitutional claim in the state courts. After Fay, prisoners were free
to file habeas petitions based on "new law" that did not exist at the
time of their trials. And, at the same time, the Court's move toward
incorporation of the Bill of Rights spurred the development of new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure. This combination of the
expansion of the scope of federal habeas and the changes in federal
constitutional rules of criminal procedure triggered the first wave of
habeas retroactivity cases, including Linkletter.
Habeas retroactivity, in other words, is an issue that is less than
45 See Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 247,262-63 (1988); Mayers, The
Habeas Corpus Actof 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31,54
n. 89 (1965).
46See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
Harv. L. Rev. 441,462 (1963).
47344 U.S. 443 (1953).
4SAs Justice Harlan pointed out in Defist, "[i]t was the rare case in which the habeas peti-
tioner had raised a 'new' constitutional argument both at his original trial and on appeal." 394
U.S. 244, 261 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
-9372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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thirty years old. Moreover, although Linkletter was a case of statutory
construction, and although stare decisis is normally at its strongest in
such cases, Linkletter was an unusual case of statutory construction.
The post-Civil War history of federal habeas reveals that Congress
either has followed the lead of the Supreme Court in defining the
scope of federal habeas, or has remained completely silent in the face
of the Court's numerous decisions interpreting the Act of 1867. As a
result, the Court has come to view the construction of the Act of 1867
as a subject almost completely within its own domain. 5°
Nor has Congress chosen to address habeas retroactivity during
the quarter-century since the Court first dealt with the issue in Link-
letter. The only hint of Congressional intent on the subject is con-
tained in a 1966 amendment to 28 U.S.C. Section 2244 (c), which
deals with the res judicata effect of a decision in a habeas case on a
later case filed by the same petitioner. The circumstances identified
by Congress that would warrant relief on a new federal habeas peti-
tion filed by the same petitioner, where the Supreme Court had af-
firmed the denial of the previous petition, include "the existence of a
material and controllingfact which did not appear in the record of the
proceeding in the Supreme Court. 51 Congress did not mention, as a
legitimate reason for filing a new petition, a change in the governing
law. And it seems unlikely that Congress would have limited new pe-
titions in this way, if it believed that claims based on changes in the
governing law should be cognizable in a petitioner's first habeas peti-
tion. In any event, however, this single, indirect treatment of the
retroactivity issue does not permit the conclusion that Congress has
established a policy on the issue.
B. THE COMPETING THEORIES OF FEDERAL HABEAS
Not surprisingly, given this lack of historical guidance, the debate
about habeas retroactivity in Teague was transformed into a debate
about the theory of federal habeas. Justice O'Connor, for the plu-
rality, argued that a general rule of non-retroactivity, and not the
Linkletter balancing test, was consistent with the theory that the pur-
pose of federal habeas is to provide an incentive for state judges "to
501n Wainwright v. Sykes, for example, the Court referred to its "historic willingness to over-
turn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the statutory language
authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged." 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).
5128 U.S.C. §2244(c) (1964 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).
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conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established
constitutional principles."152 If state judges fail to do so, then the
federal courts will grant writs of habeas corpus, overturning convic-
tions and releasing prisoners from state custody. Presumably state
judges do not wish to see their judgments upset in the federal courts,
and do not wish to see persons convicted in their courtrooms set free.
Federal habeas thus operates as a deterrent, ensuring that state
judges will "toe the constitutional mark."5 3
Justice Brennan, in his Teague dissent, relied upon the competing
theory of federal habeas that he had articulated with great force and
conviction in his opinion for the Court in Fay v. Noia. 54 There, Jus-
tice Brennan wrote that the common-law history of the writ shows
that "its function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious rem-
edy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. 55
Federal habeas ensures that imprisonment "conform[s] with the fun-
damental requirements of law," and provides "a mode for the redress
of denials of due process of law."'5 6 About the Act of 1867, Justice
Brennan wrote that Congress "was anticipating resistance to its Re-
construction measures," and made federal habeas available to pris-
oners in state custody so that "federal constitutional rights of
personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity
for plenary federal review." 57 In short, according to Justice Brennan,
federal habeas is available "whenever a person's liberty is unconstitu-
tionally restrained." 5 8
Which of these two competing theories of federal habeas articu-
lated in Teague, the "deterrence of state courts" theory or the "vin-
dication of federal rights/protection of liberty" theory, is correct as a
matter of legislative intent? In the overwhelming majority of federal
habeas cases, the answer is "both." In the typical habeas case, the
federal rights of the defendant are violated by an error committed by
the state court, and a grant of habeas relief thus serves both purposes:
52109 S.Ct. at 1073, quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
5 3Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971) (Harlan,J., dissentingand concurring
in the judgment).
54Note 9 supra.
S5372 U.S. at 401-2.
561d. at 402.
571d. at 415, 424.
S8Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1084 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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It vindicates the petitioner's federal rights, and by doing so it serves
to deter the state courts from ignoring or misconstruing such rights
in the future.
Nor could the Congress that adopted the Act of 1867 have distin-
guished between the purpose of protecting the federal rights of de-
fendants and the purpose of deterring state court misconduct. As
Justice Brennan noted in Fay, the Act of 1867 was adopted in an ef-
fort to ensure that state courts would faithfully enforce Reconstruction-
era legislation, primarily those laws providing federal rights to freed
slaves. This interpretation of the legislative intent, on the surface,
seems consistent with the theory that the purpose of habeas is to de-
ter state courts from ignoring or misapplying federal law. Of course,
the Reconstruction Congress would also have willingly agreed that
the purpose of the Act of 1867 was to protect the persons in whose
behalf those federal laws had been, or were about to be, enacted.
From the point of view of the Congress in 1867, the two theories of
federal habeas would have been functionally equivalent.
Only with the Court's expansion of the scope of federal habeas in
Brown and Fay did the "deterrence of state courts" and "vindication
of federal rights/protection of liberty" theories of federal habeas
become at least potentially separable. As soon as prisoners were per-
mitted to raise claims of error based on the adoption of new con-
stitutional rules, then it began to matter which of the two theories of
federal habeas prevails. The "new law" cases raised, for the first
time, the issue whether habeas relief should be granted solely for the
purpose of vindicating current interpretations of federal law, even
though the state courts had decided the case properly under the
federal law as it existed at the time and therefore did not need or de-
serve to be sent a deterrence "message."
Cases such as Teague and Penry represent a crucial theoretical fork
in the habeas road. They are the only class of habeas cases in which a
defendant's federal constitutional rights, as understood at the time of
the habeas proceeding, might have been violated, even though the
state court conducted the defendant's trial in compliance with all
then-applicable federal constitutional standards.
Interestingly, there is another class of habeas cases that presents a
"mirror image" of the Teague retroactivity problem. That is the class
of cases like Stone v. Powell,5 9 in which the Court held that Fourth
59428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Amendment claims are not cognizable on federal habeas. The Stone
Court wrote that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not a
personal right of the defendant, but instead exists solely as a tool to
deter police misconduct. Under Stone, when a state court violates ex-
isting Fourth Amendment law, the court may need a deterrence
"message," 60 but the defendant has no personal right that needs to be
vindicated. Once one treats the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule as a prophylactic device, then the Fourth Amendment context,
like the Teague "new law" context, is one in which the two purposes of
habeas can be separated. 61
C. THE DEFINITION OF "NEW LAW"
The Court's adoption of the "deterrence of state courts" theory of
federal habeas, in Teague and Penry, has important doctrinal conse-
quences. For example, because the theory holds that the purpose of
habeas is to provide an incentive for state judges to do what the Court
believes they are supposed to do, the definition of "new law," which
determines the scope of federal judicial oversight of a state judge's
decision, becomes the crucial element of the Teague rule. Beneath this
definition lurks the following question: What is the appropriate stan-
dard of care for state judges deciding federal constitutional issues?
Or, more to the point, what is the standard of care to which state
judges should be held by their federal counterparts?
These are, to say the least, questions without easy answers. One
approach, suggested by Justice Scalia in his Penry opinion, is that a
state judge should be expected to do no more than act "reasonably"
and "in good faith." 62 This "reasonable good faith" standard of care
would shield most kinds of constitutional error in state criminal trials
from federal habeas review. In a case where a state judge is faced with
"palpable uncertainty as to what the [Supreme Court's] rule might
6°See Bradley, Are the State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Preliminary
Study, 77 Geo. L.J. 251 (1988).
6'The Stone Court held, in effect, that a grant of habeas relief to fulfill the "deterrence of state
courts" purpose, if such a grant of relief would not also serve the "vindication of federal
rights/protection of liberty" purpose, is inappropriate. This, of course, does not compel the
conclusion that a grant of habeas relief to fulfill the "vindication of federal rights/protection of
liberty" purpose, if it would not also serve the "deterrence of state courts" purpose, is likewise
inappropriate.
62 109 S.Ct. at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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be," 63 for example, any careful, good faith attempt to decipher the
meaning of the Supreme Court's precedents would insulate the state
judge's ruling from reversal by a federal habeas court. Even a later
decision by the Supreme Court replacing such "palpable uncer-
tainty" with a clearer rule would not trigger habeas review of the
conviction.
The only kind of case that can be reversed on federal habeas, un-
derJustice Scalia's "reasonable good faith" standard, is one in which
the state judge misapplies clear, binding federal precedent. Justice
Scalia's view is therefore analogous to the minimal duty imposed on a
police officer in a search warrant case under the current construction
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
At the opposite extreme is the functional equivalent of "strict lia-
bility," under which a state judge is subject to reversal by a federal
habeas court any time the judge gets a federal issue wrong, regardless
of how reasonable the judge's conclusion may have seemed at the
time. This is, in effect, a doctrine of full habeas retroactivity. The
few judges and commentators who have held this view, such as Jus-
tice Douglas, are not concerned about "deterring" state judges at
all. 4 As is true of strict liability in other contexts, such as tort law
and criminal law, strict liability in the habeas context provides no
greater deterrence than a rule requiring a minimal degree of fault or
culpability on the part of the actor involved. 65 Rather, the "strict lia-
bility" approach is concerned with providing a remedy for the in-
jured party, or in this context, the defendant whose conviction was
tainted by constitutional error.
In Teague, and again in Penry, Justice O'Connor unfortunately
treats the "new law" issue as if it could be resolved simply by consult-
ing an appropriate legal dictionary. "New law," to repeat the words
of Justice O'Connor in Teague, is the end result of any case that
"breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal Government, 66 or in which "the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became fi-
nal."67
631bid.
64See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 713 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
6SSee Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Supreme Court Review 107, 109.
66109 S.Ct. at 1070.
67Ibid.
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Based on her application of the "new law" standard in Teague and
Penry, Justice O'Connor's view of "new law" appears to lie somewhere
between "reasonable good faith" and "strict liability." Nevertheless,
there is reason for concern about where Justice O'Connor, as the swing
vote, stands on this issue. According to Justice O'Connor, state judges
should not have been expected to anticipate the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Rock v. Arkansas68 and Ford v. Wainwright,69 the two exam-
ples of "new law" cited in Teague. Her citations to Rock and Ford are
most curious. Rock involved a relatively minor extension of long-
standing federal constitutional precedent to a narrow factual situa-
tion. And Ford was a case in which several centuries of common law,
as well as the statutes of virtually every state, already recognized the
right at issue. The only question in Ford was whether the Court
would find the right within the Eighth Amendment as well.
The citations to Rock and Ford suggest that, in Justice O'Connor's
view, state judges need not be expected to do any more than fill in the
most obvious interstitial gaps in the existing federal precedents in or-
der to avoid reversal on habeas. This represents, however, an inap-
propriately crabbed view of the duties of a state judge when
interpreting federal constitutional law. As Justice Fortas wrote in a
dissent to an early habeas retroactivity decision, "it is proper for a
habeas court to require 'conceptual faithfulness' to our opinions and
'not merely decisional obedience' to the rules they announce. 70
Justice O'Connor's definition of "new law" in Teague is much
broader, and thus less favorable for defendants, than the standard
previously used to decide whether a retroactivity issue exists. Before
Teague, a new rule was considered "new law" only if it represented a
"clear break with the past, '71 or if it "overrule[d] clear past prece-
dent, or disrupt[ed] a practice long accepted and widely relied
upon." 72 Given the tendency of all courts to characterize new rules as
mere incremental changes in the law, the "clear break" standard was
not often met. After Teague, however, almost all new rules will qual-
68483 U.S. 44 (1987).
69477 U.S. 399 (1986).
70Desistv. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 277 (1969)(Fortas,J., dissenting).
71Id. at 248.
72Miltonv. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 381 n.2 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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ify as "new law," since it will be difficult to say that such rules are
"dictated by prior precedent. 73
It is ironic that the Court's definition of "new law," as expressed by
Justice O'Connor in Teague, places so little responsibility on a state
judge to anticipate changes in the governing federal law. The stan-
dard of care for state judges under Teague is substantially less burden-
some than that applicable to a defendant and his attorney under the
Court's procedural default doctrine of Wainwrigbt v. Sykes. 74 The
Court expects a defense attorney, or even apro se defendant, to raise
at trial any legal challenges that have been made to courts in other
cases, or that have been accepted by another court anywhere in the
country. If the attorney or defendant fails to raise such an issue at
trial, in violation of a state procedural rule, then the issue is generally
unavailable as a basis for later habeas relief.
The Teague doctrine does not change the way in which the pro-
cedural default rule works against habeas petitioners. But Teague
does effectively overrule the Court's decision in favor of the peti-
tioner in Reed v. Ross, 75 where the petitioner was allowed to raise a
procedurally defaulted claim on federal habeas because the claim
was sufficiently "novel" at the time of the petitioner's trial that his
attorney could not be faulted for failing to raise it. After Teague, any
claim as "novel" as the one in Reed v. Ross will not apply retroactively
to habeas cases anyway, so procedural default becomes irrelevant.
Of course, the role of a state judge differs from that of a defense
attorney or defendant. We do not want a judge to decide a case in a
defendant's favor based on the mere fact that the same issue was
raised in another case or accepted by another judge. Instead, we
want state judges to decide cases based on their best judgment about
what the applicable law is, and how that law applies to the case at bar.
731n Teague, Justice Brennan supported this conclusion by citing nineteen recent Supreme
Court habeas cases in which the requested new rule would have been "new law" underJustice
O'Connor's definition. 109 S.Ct. at 1088-1090 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Many of the 19 cases
did not give rise to retroactivity issues under the pre-Teague "new law" standard. The "new
law" definition in Teague retains some flexibility, as evidenced by the lengthy discussion of the
"new law" issue in Penry. See 109 S.Ct. at 2944-47 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 2964-65
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This flexibility would permit a future
Court to narrow the definition without explicitly overruling it. Nevertheless, the Teague defini-
tion clearly increases the likelihood that a new rule will be held to be "new law" for retroactivity
purposes.
74433 U.S. 72 (1977).
75468 U.S. 1 (1984).
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There is something unseemly, however, about adopting a definition
of "new law" for habeas retroactivity purposes that does not require a
state judge conscientiously to weigh and consider the likelihood that
a defendant's federal claim is part of a developing trend.
D. THE DEFINITION OF "FINAL"
In Teague, Justice O'Connor defined "new law" as any rule that
was not dictated by precedent existing "at the time the defendant's
conviction became final."' 76 Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor did
not resolve the issue of when a state conviction becomes "final." At
one point in Teague, she quoted Justice Powell's statement in Solem v.
Stumes77 that the governing law should be the law "in effect at the
time of the conviction. 78 Later, she suggested that the test should be
whether the "trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitu-
tional standards. '79 Finally, in Penry, she declared that the peti-
tioner's conviction "became final . . .when this Court denied his
petition for certiorari on direct review."80
Because Teague was premised on the theory that federal habeas
serves to deter constitutional errors by state judges, the appropriate
time to "fix" the applicable federal law for purposes of habeas review
is when the state judges have rendered their final decision on direct
review of the case. Any change in the governing federal law between
the last state-court decision affirming a defendant's conviction and
the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, perhaps a year or more
later, is as irrelevant to the "deterrence" theory as a change in the
governing federal law occurring after the denial of certiorari. In ei-
ther case, the propriety of the state court's decision is unaffected.
In addition to the theoretical argument, practical concerns support
defining finality in terms of the last state court decision on direct re-
view. A retroactivity rule focusing on the law in existence at the time
of the Court's denial of certiorari would create a strong incentive for
defendants to file certiorari petitions, hoping that some beneficial
new rule might be announced during the pendency of the petition.
76109 S.Ct. at 1070.
77465 U.S. 638 (1984).
78 109 S.Ct. at 1073, quoting Stumes, 465 U.S. at 653 (Powell, J., concurring).
79109 S.Ct. at 1075.
80109 S.Ct. at 2944.
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This would simply transfer work from the lower federal courts to the
Supreme Court.
III. TEAGUE AND FEDERAL HABEAS PRACTICE
A. THE IMPACT ON HABEAS PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS AND COURTS OF APPEALS
In the district courts, the most obvious practical impact will be
that prisoners will quickly learn to conform their habeas petitions to
the new rule set out in Teague. Prisoners learned not to allege Fourth
Amendment violations after the Court excluded such claims from
habeas review in Stone v. Powell,81 and to recast Fourth Amendment
claims as ineffective assistance of counsel claims after Kimmelman v.
Morrison.8 2 Similarly, prisoners after Teague will learn to allege that
the state courts violated existing federal law, and not to allege claims
based on "new law" declared after their convictions became "final,"
or on requests for adoption of such "new law" by the district court.
The method of reviewing habeas petitions in the district courts
will also change as a result of Teague. Whenever a habeas petition is
based on an alleged violation of existing federal law, the district court
will first have to decide what the law was at the time of the original
state proceeding. Under Teague, this inquiry will focus on the exist-
ing Supreme Court precedent and any other rules that would have
been "dictated" by the precedent. Of course, Penry demonstrates just
how difficult such an inquiry can be for a lower court; with respect to
Penry's jury instruction claim, the Supreme Court split five-to-four
over whether the claim was based on existing law or "new law."
Although the inquiry into the existing federal law will not always
be easy, the district courts may find consolation in the fact that there
will be very few meritorious second or subsequent petitions. The
fact that Teague "freezes" the federal law applicable to a petitioner,
coupled with existing habeas doctrines concerning successive peti-
tions and abuse of the writ, 83 effectively establishes a "one petition"
81428 U.S. 465 (1976).
82477 U.S. 365 (1986). See Manville & Brezna, Post-Conviction Remedies: A Self-Help
Manual, 60-61 (1988) (discussing how state prisoners may recast Fourth Amendment claims as
ineffective assistance claims).
83See Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States bistrict
Courts; Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
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rule. In essence, any claim in a second or subsequent petition based
on a new rule that is sufficiently "dictated" by prior precedent to
avoid the label, "new law," will be barred because it either was or
should have been raised in the first petition. Thus, although Teague
may not reduce the total number of federal habeas petitions, it will
reduce the burden that review of such petitions imposes on the dis-
trict courts, because in most instances only a petitioner's first habeas
petition will require substantial judicial time and effort.
Of course, a petitioner who can show that his claim fits within one
of the exceptions to Teague for certain categories of "new law" will be
entitled to relief on a second or subsequent habeas petition, assuming
all of the usual procedural requirements are satisfied. But the excep-
tions have been defined so narrowly that only a handful of "new law"
decisions will fit within one of them. The first exception, for sub-
stantive rules dealing with the validity of crimes or punishments,
will apply to very few decisions outside the context of the death
penalty. And, as Justice O'Connor noted in Teague, it is unlikely that
many new rules would fit within the second exception, because most
rules that might be considered essential to an accurate conviction
have already been declared. 84
The habeas practice in the courts of appeals is likely to change in
much the same way that it will change in the district courts. Federal
appellate courts will face either claims that the state courts have mis-
applied existing federal law, or claims that the district courts have
misinterpreted some aspect of the Teague rule, such as the scope of
"new law" or one of the exceptions to the doctrine. The determina-
tion of the existing federal law will often be problematic, but the
appellate courts will need to pay little attention to most second or
subsequent habeas petitions.
B. THE IMPACT ON HABEAS PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT
In the Supreme Court, Teague will have a major impact on the
habeas caseload. The new retroactivity rule will dramatically reduce
the likelihood that a habeas petitioner will obtain a writ of certiorari
to challenge the denial of habeas relief by a federal court of appeals.
This is because most habeas petitioners who lose in the court of ap-
peals will have only two choices when considering possible certiorari
review. The petitioner can file a petition for certiorari alleging that
84109 S.Ct. at 1077.
[1989
HABEAS CORPUS 187
the state courts misapplied the existing federal law, which is not
likely to be viewed by the Supreme Court as an issue worthy of a
grant of certiorari.8 5 Alternatively, the petitioner can file a petition
for certiorari raising a "new law" issue that might interest the Court,
but Teague will prevent the Court from taking such a case to resolve
the "new law" issue, unless one of the two exceptions applies. After
Teague, therefore, the Court will be likely to review only two kinds of
habeas cases: those in which the state warden lost in the court of ap-
peals, and those in which the petitioner lost, but which present a
certworthy issue involving the definition of "new law" or the ap-
plicability of one of the exceptions to the Teague rule.
Attorneys who represent many habeas petitioners, such as legal
clinics or public defenders, will soon realize that they have very little
to gain, and perhaps much to lose for their other habeas clients, by
seeking to take a habeas case from the court of appeals to the Su-
preme Court. This is because, absent an applicable exception, the
Court can only rule against a "new law" claim in a habeas case. In the
vast majority of cases, the Court cannot adopt "new law" in a habeas
petitioner's favor. Once the futility of filing a certiorari petition in a
habeas case becomes understood, the number of such filings will
likely decrease.
C. THE SPECIAL CATEGORY OF CAPITAL CASES
One of the most significant effects of the Teague doctrine will be
felt in capital cases. The Teague rule will shorten federal habeas litiga-
tion in capital cases by reducing the time spent in reviewing second
or subsequent habeas petitions.
The lengthy delays incurred as a result of federal habeas litigation
in capital cases have been documented and criticized. 8 6 The problem
is that a capital defendant, unlike all other defendants, has little or no
85See Rule 17, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
86As one recent federal report noted, "[t]he problem of delay [due to habeas litigation] has
been particularly acute in capital cases. In such cases, the continuation of litigation prevents the
sentence from being carried out." Office of Legal Policy, Report on Federal Habeas Corpus
Review of State Judgments 37 (1988) (Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 7). See also Rob-
bins, Rationalizing Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Criminal Convictions in
Capital Cases, Background and Issues Paper, A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section Task Force on
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus 8-9 (1989) ("[Flederal habeas corpus review of [capital] cases
appears to most observers to be both chaotic and protracted.... Despite the frantic pace of
some of these proceedings, death penalty litigation in most cases is quite protracted. It is rare
for a death sentence to be carried out within five or six years of its imposition").
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incentive to speed up the pace of habeas review of his conviction and
sentence. Quite the contrary-for prisoners on death row, the longer
the review process takes, the better.
In recent years, two major reform initiatives have been instituted
to deal with this problem.87 In September 1989, the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, also known as the
Powell Committee, proposed amendments to the federal habeas stat-
ute that would apply only to habeas petitions filed in capital cases. 88
Under the proposal, if a state provides qualified counsel to handle
state post-conviction proceedings in capital cases, then capital de-
fendants in that state would be (1) subjected to a 180-day statute of
limitations for filing their federal habeas petitions, with a possible
60-day extension for good cause, (2) limited to one federal habeas pe-
tition absent a claim that raises serious doubt about the defendant's
guilt, and that was not raised previously because of a valid excuse,
such as newly discovered evidence, and (3) prevented from challeng-
ing the effectiveness of their state post-conviction attorneys.
The Powell Committee's proposal to provide state post-conviction
counsel for capital defendants is laudable, but the remainder of the
proposal is misguided. The proposal reduces the delay in capital
cases attributable to habeas litigation by forcing capital defendants to
file their first federal habeas petitions sooner than is required of other
defendants. The proposal also bars, in capital cases only, all second
or subsequent federal habeas petitions that do not raise a serious
doubt about factual guilt. These aspects raise serious questions about
the actual and perceived fairness of the Powell Committee's proposal.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the proposal has drawn fire from com-
mentators who, while agreeing with the provision of state post-
conviction counsel, object strenuously to "singling out" capital cases
for accelerated review.
The Teague doctrine will also have an effect on the problem of
lengthy habeas litigation in capital cases, although it will do so with-
87The American Bar Association has set up a State-Federal Task Force on Death Penalty
Habeas Corpus to address the concerns raised by the "chaotic and protracted" federal habeas
litigation in capital cases. See Robbins, note 86 supra, at 8-9, 13. In addition, Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist in January, 1988, requested the Conference of ChiefJustices to study
ways to deal with the problems of federal habeas litigation in capital cases. See id. at 12. This
request led to the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
Cases, an organ of theJudicial Conference of the United States chaired by retiredJustice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. The Committee has come to be known as the Powell Committee.
88See 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239-3245 (September 27, 1989).
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out "singling out" capital cases for special treatment. What must be
recognized is that the delay caused by habeas litigation in capital
cases is often a direct product of habeas retroactivity. A common sce-
nario looks like this: The state sets an execution date. A few days be-
fore the scheduled execution, the defendant files a federal habeas
petition in the district court, raising one or more colorable constitu-
tional claims in an effort to get a stay of execution. Unable to resolve
the merits of the habeas petition before the scheduled execution, the
district court or court of appeals grants a stay. 89 The standard review
process, including a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
takes a year or more. Meanwhile, a year's worth of new constitutional
criminal procedure decisions have been issued by the federal courts.
Certiorari is denied, and the state sets a new execution date. Now the
cycle begins again, with the defendant raising all of the "new law"
claims based on the intervening year's decisions.
This potentially endless cycle of habeas review will be cut short, in
most capital cases, by the Teague doctrine. Because the definition of
"new law" in Teague is so broad, the federal courts will find it easy to
dismiss second or subsequent habeas petitions on the ground that the
claims contained therein are based on "new law." Alternatively, peti-
tions raising claims not based on "new law" will be easily dismissed
as a successive petition or an abuse of the writ. Either way, the courts
will be able to dismiss such petitions quickly enough to avoid the
need for a stay of execution. Without a stay of execution, the cycle
ends.
The only "new law" claims that will entitle a capital defendant to
relief on a second or subsequent habeas petition will be those that fit
within one of the exceptions to the Teague doctrine. Thus, the only
second or subsequent petitions that will require a stay of execution
will be those raising a substantial claim that likely fits within one of
the exceptions. Of course, one of the exceptions, after Penry, in-
cludes all substantive Eighth Amendment challenges to the validity
of the death penalty for particular classes of defendants or crimes.
And the exception for claims based on procedures without which
there is a substantial likelihood that an innocent defendant would be
89 1n Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme Court authorized the lower
federal courts to adopt procedures for expedited review of capital habeas cases on motions for
stays of execution. However, a stay will be granted where the defendant makes a "substantial
showing of the denial of (a] federal right" and where a stay is required to prevent the case from
becoming moot. Id. at 893.
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convicted will also be triggered by some "new law" decisions in the
capital context. But these exceptions will likely apply to only one or
two decisions each Term, and not all capital defendants will be en-
titled to relief under such decisions. In most capital cases, the Teague
doctrine will eliminate the need for federal courts to spend much
time reviewing second or subsequent petitions, and will thereby
avoid the cycle of habeas review.
IV. TEAGUE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CONsTITuriONAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of Teague will be
its institutional effect on the development of federal constitutional
rules of criminal procedure. The extent of this effect cannot be esti-
mated with precision at the present time. Nevertheless, it is quite
possible that Teague, because of its relocation of responsibility among
the various institutions that participate in the development of consti-
tutional criminal procedure, will tip the sensitive criminal procedure
balance toward the societal interest in preventing and punishing crime,
and away from the rights of the individual criminal defendant. 90
The constitutional criminal procedure "revolution" of the 1960s
and 1970s took place almost exclusively in the federal courts. The
Supreme Court, of course, during and even after Chief Justice War-
ren's tenure, led the way. But the lower federal courts played an
important role as well, advancing the "revolution" directly by inter-
preting and applying the Court's new precedents, and indirectly by
framing many criminal procedure issues for the Court's subsequent
consideration. 9
Today, the "revolution" has ended, and federal constitutional rules
of criminal procedure are evolving at a much more leisurely pace. But
it is still true that the federal courts, and particularly the lower
courts, play a central role in the development of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure.
Meanwhile, the inclinations of state courts to expand, or to protect
vigilantly, the rights of defendants vary widely. In recent years, when
many federal courts have become less sympathetic to defendants'
rights, some state courts have interpreted their state constitutions to
9°See Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 149-73 (1968).




provide greater protection for defendants than the comparable fed-
eral constitutional provisions. 92 Other state courts, however, con-
tinue to construe both their state constitutions and the federal
constitution narrowly, recognizing defendants' claims only when
compelled to do so by controlling precedent. 93 The views of these
courts may reflect hostility toward defendants or simply the inevi-
table effect of institutional differences between the federal and state
courts.
9 4
After Teague and Penry, the lower federal courts will find them-
selves significantly less capable of participating meaningfully in the
development of federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure.
Outside the context of the Fourth Amendment, most of the oppor-
tunities for the lower federal courts to declare "new rules" of con-
stitutional criminal procedure, or to expound on the meaning or
application of such "new rules," arise in federal habeas cases. This is
because there are many more state criminal prosecutions than federal
ones, and because state procedures vary more than do federal pro-
cedures, thus raising more interesting and difficult criminal pro-
cedure issues.
The institutional effect of Teague will be to deprive the lower
federal courts of most of their opportunities to make "new law" in
federal habeas cases, or at least to make "new law" in a criminal de-
fendant's favor. And, of course, the lower federal courts do not have
the power to review state criminal cases on direct appeal. Thus,
Teague will shift the primary responsibility for the development of
federal rules of constitutional criminal procedure, in the sense of in-
terpreting and applying new Supreme Court precedents and fram-
ing issues for the Court's consideration, from the lower federal courts
92See Latzer, Limits oftheNew Federalism: State Court Responses, 14 Search & Seizure L.
Rep. 89 (1987) (listing state courts that have rejected narrow Supreme Court interpretations of
the Fourth Amendment); see generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of In-
dividual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
93See Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Preliminary Study,
77 Geo. L.J. 251 (1988) (suggesting that state courts in Georgia, and perhaps in Arizona and
South Carolina, have stopped enforcing the Fourth Amendment since Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976), removed such claims from federal habeas review).
94See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1115-28 (1977); see also
Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary, 36 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 233 (1988); Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Com-
ment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 329 (1988);
Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor
Redish, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 369(1988).
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to the state courts. Only the Court itself will be able to "converse"
with the state courts on issues of constitutional criminal procedure. 95
The increase in recent years in prosecutions for federal crimes,
such as drug and white-collar offenses, will provide the lower federal
courts with some opportunities to declare "new law." This will be
true especially in areas of constitutional criminal procedure that are
likely to arise in federal criminal cases, such as constitutional rules
relating to grand jury practice. And the exceptions to the Teague rule
will allow some federal habeas cases involving "new law" issues to get
into the lower federal courts. Nevertheless, by removing from the
scope of federal habeas most claims of state prisoners that are based
on "new law," Teague will greatly reduce the opportunities for the
lower federal courts to advance the development of constitutional
criminal procedure.
The shifting of primary responsibility for the development of con-
stitutional criminal procedure from the lower federal courts to the
state courts will likely produce two long-term effects. First, it will
produce more conflicts in the interpretation and application of crimi-
nal procedure rules, because the lower federal courts will no longer
be able to use federal habeas to discourage the states in a single
federal circuit from adopting different points of view. Second, and
more importantly, it will alter, at least in some states, the degree of
procedural protection afforded defendants. In states where the state
courts are more sympathetic to defendants than the federal courts,
there will be no such effect, because those state courts can already
provide added protection under their state constitutions. But where
the state courts are less sympathetic than their federal counterparts,
defendants will suffer, because the unsympathetic state courts will
control the interpretation and application of both the state and the
federal constitutions. It is in this sense that Teague may tip the crimi-
nal procedure balance toward crime control and away from the rights
of the individual defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Teague v. Lane and Penry v. Lynaugh, the Supreme Court did
what commentators have been suggesting for a long time-a major-
ity of the Court agreed upon a single, coherent theory that explains
95 See Cover & Aleinikoff, note 91 supra, at 1052-54.
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the purpose of federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convic-
tions. As I have explained in this article, the full impact of the Court's
new vision of federal habeas may surprise a great many people. Per-
haps the Court, or Congress, will ultimately decide to modify the
Teague habeas retroactivity rule and ameliorate some of the effects I
have identified. In the meantime, however, the Teague rule will likely
force courts, litigants, and commentators to rethink their entire ap-
proach to issues of habeas law and practice.

